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What sutras (principles) do we extract from the three chapters on Britain in Martti
Koskenniemi’s To the Uttermost Parts of the Earth (TUPE)? Part III of the book has
three chapters—8,9,10 covering years between 1394 and 1869—on Britain. These
three chapters introduce us to a remarkably large number of thinkers in the centuries
it covers. The result is a kaleidoscopic text, almost exclusively based on old books,
of telescopic restatements of the works on Britain and empire. Thinkers come after
thinkers as Koskenniemi’s fluent text informs the readers of their place in the history
of legal ideas. As a result, it recenters European men in our discipline’s history, a
luxury of European armchair historiography. Koskenniemi bookends Part III between
Edmund Burke (p. 561) and Robert Phillimore’s justification for “intervention” as
incidental to the “rule of equality of states” (p. 793). TUPE would be the compulsory
textbook I will enter my classes on the history of European legal imaginations with.
But will I also end my class with it? Let’s see.
Edmund Burke’s Britain
When not talking about the Englishmen, Edmund Burke—the famous prosecutor
of Warren Hastings for his breach of agreement with Raja Chait Singh of Benaras,
among his other “misdemeanors”—would opine on the French Revolution. TUPE’s
Part 3 on Britain begins with Burke: Burke advocated for common law as the
accumulation of “deeper wisdom” against the legislature and statutes.
Working under royal prerogative, Koskenniemi tells us, British seamen by the
18th century made regular but eclectic use of the idioms of law of nature and
nations. It is this eclecticism that for Koskenniemi strigs the European thinkers and
judges together in a garland of legal continuity. Since power of the British state
was inseparable from the prosperity of the Englishmen, commercial freedom, as
liberty came to be defined, sat compatibly with its absence in the four corners
of the growing British Empire (p. 563). Chapter 8 sees a dialectic between royal
prerogative and “right to property” allowing the British Empire’s ability to “give law to
the world” (p. 564).
At the root of British prosperity—and French poverty—were “better laws” in England
where the Monarch taxed his subjects but with the latter’s consent (p. 565). Utopians
soon joined the conversation. Thomas More, a King’s Bench justice, argued that
human beings are united more by “kindness than contracts”. Such utopians argued
for favourable actions for traders injured in foreign lands by unfair laws (p. 567).
They accepted slavery but rejected class that created imbalances of wealth.
Next, Thomas Smith argued that domestic prices increased since the value of the
local currency was debased to discourage import. Clearly, domestic economy did
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not function in isolation. Invoking Thomas More’s Utopia, Smith advocated the
colonization of Ireland since the English island was overpopulated. For Smith the
Irish were uncivil and savage perfectly cut out for benefitting from the virtues of
British colonization (pp. 570-71).
Civil Law as International Law
Privateering became an industry in Elizabethan England. In the war against Spain
(1584-1604) only 34 out of the 197 were Crown ships. Augmenting the British naval
hegemony was a combination of profits from privateering and nationalism. Issues
of prize law, maritime matters, and crimes at sea involved routine application of the
law of nations before the High Court of Admiralty. And it was civil law, not common
law, that explained to the world the connection between the Crown and international
law. Civil law, an off-shoot of Roman law, had a clearer exposition of the centrifugal
application of laws beyond the immediate metropole. Civil law therefore presented
English lawyers with a useful déjà vu on governing the seas and beyond as common
law was local. Jennifer Pitts in Boundaries of the International, however, notes that
the British notions of Roman precedents legitimizing the interests of the British
subjects the world over “rested on a poor reading of Roman history” (p. 178).
Meanwhile, besides the spectacular cases of war and peace, ius gentium governed
the conduct of trade and settlement by private actors, merchants, and companies.
The popularity of civil law among the English soon faced the jealously of the
common law. Civil lawyers split the law of nations into two: one that supported the
king’s sovereignty and the universal nature of the private rights of Englishmen.
Edward Coke fought back. Coke argued for the alignment of the common law
with natural reason to make common law export-worthy. Justice for Coke was far
more important than legal theory, a concern of the civil lawyers, even as Crown
prerogative began to cut into parliamentary powers. By creating monopoly, Coke
argued, royal prerogative “harmed” the common Englishmen’s freedom of trade and
commerce (pp. 579-83).
Corporations became an important part of early modern English governments as
an extension of Crown powers beyond England. Companies working under Crown
charters conducted foreign trade and brought wealth. They were answerable to
courts but not to the Parliament. Through charters the king allowed the corporations
to establish treaty relations with foreign powers. The charter empowered companies
to conquer foreign territories that were not already under European occupation
(p. 588). A purported universal law of reason, lex mercatoria—separate from the
consent-based law of nations of diplomatic practices—was seen as “permanent and
constant”. Trade thus became an instrument of statecraft.
Nowhere was this English statecraft more visible than in East Indies where
Portuguese, French, and Dutch wrestled with English for monopoly. The British East
India Company (the EIC) began its life in India “in Surat where the EIC received
trading rights from the Mughal emperor in 1612” (p. 765). The EIC became the most
powerful force on the Indian subcontinent “playing the local princes against each
other, against the Mughal empire, and its European rivals” (p. 600). The English civil
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war, meanwhile, raised the question of king’s prerogative powers for overseas trade
against parliamentary duty to guard the landed gentry.
Limiting of Crown Prerogative
England for a while was gipped with Hollandophobia; a popular sense according
to which the Dutch were aiming at a universal monarchy (Chap. 9). International
power now depended less over massive armies than on the “mastery of networks
of vital economic supplies”; an ability that enabled “giving law to others” (p. 629).
The Revolution in England led to the 1689 Declaration of Rights marking the victory
of property rights and the end of Crown prerogative sans parliamentary consent (p.
632).
Enters John Locke (p. 633). The Civil war had the effect of making the subjects
loyal to institutions instead of the king. Failure of the state to protect the person
and property of its subject, for John Locke, freed the subjects from their “duty of
obedience”. And unlike Hobbes, Locke did not imagine the state of nature as one of
perpetual fear. Natural rights persisted even if the social contract was broken. While
the normative basis of foreign policy was the Crown prerogative, the king exercised it
as part of the trust the community had placed in him. The Lockean state was a “joint-
stock” company (pp. 634-37). Capitalism wasn’t the fig leaf of royal ambitions but the
medium in which civil peace and constitution existed.
Magna Carta of the Seas
The neutrality rules ensuing from Navigation Act(s) supported British control of the
seas. While neutral trade “with” France was permitted, neutral trade “for” France
by non-French ships attracted the sanction of the British neutrality rules. The
British pursued this rule vigorously in the American War of independence. Any non-
belligerent ship carrying goods for states at war with Britain was now an enemy ship.
Europe naturally despised this British overbearance.
Blackstone (p. 648) then declared an “offence against the law of nations” in common
law. The law of nations was a system of rules “deducible from natural reason
established by universal consent”. And although compacts and treaties gave law of
nations, in the absence of a global court, domestic courts were correct in applying
it. The common law after all could hardly ignore the five-fold increase in Britain’s
foreign trade (p. 653).
Adam Smith (p. 664) spoke on the back of David Hume who thought a sense
of justice remained at the base of social relations and the law. A convention for
Hume came from the individuation of property leading to “perfect harmony and
concord” (p. 659). Nevertheless, Smith proffered a four-stage theory of human
development; the spontaneous pursuit of individual interest led to the advantage of
society as a whole (p. 664). It was the market that should lay down the conditions
for government. Justice, as the duty of the state, was central to both Hume and
Smith. For Smith, “commercial society” was the last stage of progress since passions
become economic interest guaranteed by the law (pp. 666-67). Economic contract
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not “social” contract mattered for Hume and Smith. The multiplicity of laws for them
represented the “complexity of the market” (p. 669).
Bentham’s international law was wider than Austin’s. International law for Bentham
created obligations on sovereigns but he was not sure if these obligations created
legal duties unless transformed into domestic law (p. 680).
Chapter 10 talks about “global law”. Britain rose to power with “liberties at home”
and “authoritarian expansion abroad” (p. 699). The EIC was its epitome. In India, the
EIC was caught between the Mughals in Delhi and the rising Maratha Confederacy.
The paramountcy policy allowed the British to acquire suzerainty over many Indian
princely states. The Mughals continued to give titles to the natives through sunnuds,
grants, and firmans, until the British stopped this practice. The British Parliament
meanwhile kept sapping the powers of the EIC even as it renewed charters until,
despite John Stuart Mill’s advocacy, the EIC was nationalized in 1857 after the
Sepoy Mutiny (p. 787).
China was not a colony of Britain like India. Britain’s run in with the Qing government
led to the first and second opium wars (p. 779). China was forced to import Opium
from British India (p. 782). Chinese ports were opened under unequal treaties China
signed. It led to the system of extraterritoriality; the application of foreign laws on
foreigners in China (p. 791). Phillimore supported this position in law (p. 793).
Warren Hastings’ India
TUPE’s Part 3 is somewhat resistant to the methodological revolution in international
law’s history although for a book on the history of “legal imagination” of European
men, the weaving of the events in colony is much more tangible than it was in
Koskenniemi’s The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. Koskenniemi’s engagement with
India, the Crown jewel, is moderate (pp. 772-88). While discussing the 19th century,
chapter 9 is similar to Rage for Order in that the latter covers “a global empire of
law,” “ordering the Oceans” and “an empire of states”. However, Koskennimei
covers five more centuries and Empires other than Britain. Effectively, Koskenniemi
fashions a history of “ideas” and not the history of “actions”. The ubiquity of the white
men in the colony notwithstanding, TUPE does not tell us that laissez faire was
about putting European men in Asia, and not Asians in Europe.
But a focus away from “actions” reduces the history of international law from colonial
encounters to a soliloquy of European men about law and empires, something
that worries Koskenniemi (p. 12). More problematically, it decenters the agency of
colonial subjects—native creditors, convicts, eloping lovers, princes, pirates, colonial
bureaucrats, spice traders, and mercenaries—and the legal webs their actions spin
between the metropole and the colony. Many of the ideas of the white men achieved
refinement in the spinner called global legal history when, like the hand pulling of
dough, many actors from the farm (metropole) to the soup bowl (colony) hand-pulled
the noodles.
Historians of legal imaginations are therefore duty-bound to recover—not simply as
description or apology but as contributary—the oriental side of the encounter, one
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that responded with actions, ideas, and lives, under the epistemologically auditing
European gaze. Otherwise, we may forget that, as Duncan Derrett reminded us, for
the “blending of indigenous doctrines and English techniques” in the colonies, the
natives, like Raja Nandakumar, paid with their lives. The Raja had made the mistake
of locking horns with Warren Hastings whose prosecutor was Edmund Burke who
Koskenniemi began his account of Britain with.
In any event, for peoples’ pasts, and the prices they paid, to become global legal
history, nursing geographical intimacies to the lands and actions on and about them
is necessary. Otherwise, it produces, like Koskenniemi’s sutras, the lawyer’s history
of legal imaginations. Anyhow, international law remained only incidental to this
journey to the colonies, the uttermost parts of the globe.
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